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Distinguishing Duties of Care of Sports Coaches in a UK Context 
 
Neil Partington, Lecturer in Law, Sussex Law School, University of Sussex 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
The concept of duty of care is under unprecedented scrutiny in the context of sport, and 
more specifically, with regard to sports coaching.  Existing academic scholarship offers 
limited detailed analysis of the duty of care incumbent upon coaches, the majority of whom 
are volunteers.  Moreover, Baroness Tanni Grey-Thompson’s recent and impressive ‘Duty of 
Care in Sport: Independent Report to Government’ adopts ‘a deliberately broad definition of 
“Duty of Care”’.  However, should the concept of duty of care assume both a legal and 
extra-legal meaning, it is contended that this may result in conflation of moral and legal 
duties of care.  The impact of this when defining the standard of care may expose coaches 
to a greater risk of legal liability by potentially extending the legal obligations of amateur 
coaches beyond current limits.  Accordingly, by analysing the duty of care incumbent upon 
modern-day sports coaches, within the context of the classic jurisprudential debate 
surrounding the relationship between law and morality, this article uncovers serious 
unintended ramifications of failing to more precisely distinguish between legal and moral 
duties of care in this area.  Furthermore, at a time when the concept of duty of care appears 
ever more deeply engrained in everyday language, the insights revealed here appear likely 
to transcend the specific circumstances of sports coaching and be of more widespread legal 
relevance, not least, in the burgeoning field of professional negligence. 
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Distinguishing Duties of Care of Sports Coaches in a UK Context 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The concept of duty of care is under unprecedented scrutiny in the context of sport.1  
Coaches owe a duty of care to athletes.  This duty of care may involve legal, moral and 
ethical considerations.  Baroness Tanni Grey-Thompson’s recent and impressive ‘Duty of 
Care in Sport: Independent Report to Government’ (DoC in Sport Report) convincingly 
recognises that: 
 
Winning medals is, of course, really important, but should not be at the expense of 
the Duty of Care towards athletes, coaches and others involved in the system. … it 
feels timely for the sport sector to consider Duty of Care in its fullest sense. … 
Questions are being asked about the price being paid for success.2 
 
The DoC in Sport Report adopts ‘a deliberately broad definition of “Duty of Care” -- covering 
everything from personal safety and injury, to mental health issues, to the support given to 
people at the elite level’.3  Moreover, high profile controversies about a breach of duty of 
care in various sports, and accusations of a culture of bullying, continue to come to light.4   
The growing number of athlete complaints of this nature has also resulted in coaches being 
made to feel ‘vulnerable’, prompting leading coaches in Britain to form an association to 
protect their interests.5  In these circumstances, practical reasoning determining coaching 
                                                 
1 See, for instance, Baroness Tanni Grey-Thompson, ‘Duty of Care in Sport: Independent Report to 
Government’, Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport, 21 April 2017 (DoC in Sport Report) 4; D Roan, 
‘Was 2017 the year British sport lost its way?’ (BBC News, 29 December, 2017) 
<https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-42353175> accessed 9 January 2019. 
2 DoC in Sport Report (n 1) 4.  In December 2015, as part of the Sporting Future strategy, the Minister for Sport 
asked Baroness Grey-Thompson to conduct an independent review into the Duty of Care sport has towards its 
participants. 
3 Ibid.  
4 J Anderson and N Partington, ‘Duty of care in sport: time for a sports ombudsman?’ (2018) 1 International 
Sports Law Review 3, 7-8. 
5 M Dickinson, ‘Coaches unite over bullying’, The Times, Wednesday 21 November 2018 
<https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/coaches-unite-over-bullying-by-forming-new-group-c7wp7jnxx> 
accessed 9 January 2019. 
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conduct, performance goals, and what sort of person or coach to be may be shaped by both 
law and morality.  This is the case because ‘both law and morality are about right and 
wrong, good and bad, virtue and vice. These contrasts are “normative”: they express value 
judgments’.6   
 
Problematically, whilst it has been suggested that ‘[t]he law and morality are 
inextricably interwoven’,7 Hart’s seminal jurisprudential discussion of the nature of 
morality8 contends that ‘there is no necessary connection between law and morals’.9  At 
first glance, this appears somewhat contradictory and confusing, not least, for non-lawyers 
making repeated value judgements about what might constitute reasonable coaching 
practice.  For instance, is a coach’s duty of care, derived from the tort of negligence, plainly 
informed by law, essentially informed by morality or, informed by a combination of both 
law and morality?  At present, legal scholarship tends to approach the issue of a coach’s 
duty in broad terms,10 often with an emphasis on school sport,11  thereby offering only 
limited detailed analysis of the extent of a coach’s duty of care.  The intersection between 
the law of negligence and sports coaching also appears less-often highlighted in the extant 
academic literature of sports coaching.12  This misses significant emerging complexities that 
                                                 
6 P Cane, ‘Morality, law and conflicting reasons for action’ (2012) 71(1) CLJ 59, 60.  
7 Smith New Court Securities Ltd v Scimgeour Vickers (Asset Management) Ltd [1997] AC 254 (HL), 280 (Lord 
Steyn); T Honoré, ‘The Dependence of Morality on Law’ (1993) 13 Oxford J Legal Stud 1, 3. 
8 P Cane, Responsibility in Law and Morality (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2002) 6. 
9 HLA Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’ (1959) 71 Harvard Law Review 593, 601 
(footnote).    
10 E.g., J Anderson, Modern Sports Law: A Textbook (Hart, 2010) 248; M James, Sports Law (2nd ed., Palgrave-
Macmillan, 2013) 92-97; S Greenfield et al, ‘Reconceptualising The Standard Of Care In Sport: The Case Of 
Youth Rugby In England And South Africa’ (2015) 18(6) Potchefstroom Elec. L.J. 2183. 
11 E.g., M Beloff et al, Sports Law (2nd ed., Hart, 2012) 146-48; D Griffith-Jones, ‘Civil Liability Arising Out of 
Participation in A Lewis and J Taylor, Sport: Law and Practice (2nd ed., Tottel, 2008) 737-42; E Grayson, Sport 
and the Law (3rd ed.,Tottel, 1999) 190-99; N Cox and A Schuster, Sport and the Law (Firstlaw, 2004) 230-47; H 
Hartley, Sport, Physical Recreation and the Law (Routledge, 2009) 55-63. 
12 N Partington, ‘Sports Coaching and the Law of Negligence: Implications for Coaching Practice’ (2017) 6(1) 
Sports Coaching Review 36, 37. 
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can only be understood via an analysis that highlights the importance of separating legal 
and moral duties of care, most significantly, when the notion of the duty of care assumes an 
extra-legal meaning.  In order to achieve this, this article’s analysis is set within the context 
of the classic jurisprudential debate surrounding the relationship between law and morality.  
By drawing on some of that scholarship, existing gaps in the duty of care in sport literature 
can be filled, with the nuanced arguments developed also being of more general application 
and relevance, not least, in the mainstream field of professional negligence. 
 
The article begins by discussing the context in which the concepts of law and morality, 
broadly applied,  will be critically explored.  In cautioning against conflation of the legal and 
moral duties of coaches, since these vary in scope and content, the article next conducts a 
more detailed consideration of the concepts of duty of care and standard of care.  A more 
precise understanding of this area of the law, since the seminal case of Donoghue v 
Stevenson,13 allows distinctions between legal and moral duties of care to be better 
understood and critiqued.  Following this, in considering the subsequent development of the 
law of negligence, its modern application reveals a significant shift away from its origins as a 
general moral principle.  Accordingly, the no-duty-to-assist a stranger in distress at common 
law is posited as a forceful illustration of the crucial distinction between moral and legal duties 
of care.  The intricacies and interrelationship between these respective duties is then 
subjected to sustained treatment in the specific circumstances of sports coaching, reinforcing 
how the doctrine of assumption of responsibility has the potential to bring what might 
otherwise ought to be distinct moral duties, within the confines of the standard of care 
required of coaches, thereby creating legal obligations. Ultimately, this unique vantage point 
                                                 
13 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562. 
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proves instructive in uncovering original insights that are suggested to be of importance not 
merely in the context of sport but, given the apparent tendency for duty of care terminology 
to be increasingly employed in contemporary society, are likely to be of much more 
widespread significance and application.  By revealing somewhat concealed and unintended 
potential repercussions likely to result from an uncritical conflation of legal and moral duties 
of care, the implications uncovered appear to be of considerable relevance in areas including: 
(i) other sectors largely reliant upon volunteers, since the ‘neighbour principle’ appears 
peculiarly susceptible to influence by moral and social considerations in such contexts (i.e., 
education sector; recreation and leisure sector);  (ii) the broader sphere of professional 
negligence, not least, given instances of professional liability ‘must be viewed against a 
background of constant change’;14 and (iii) by government departments, most notably, the 
UK’s Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport (DCMS), with the Minister of Sport having 
tasked Baroness Tanni Grey-Thompson with looking ‘into issues surrounding the so-called 
“Duty of Care” that sports have towards their participants’.15 
 
 
Context 
 
Modern sports coaches appear to be faced with a multitude of moral, legal and 
ethical duties, with the degeneration of the moral standards of some coaches fuelling 
contemporary interest in the ethics of sport.16  For present purposes, morality might 
broadly be regarded as the ‘rules, guidelines, mores or principles of living … that exist in 
                                                 
14 R Jackson, ‘The professions: power, privilege and legal liability’ (2015) 31(3) Professional Negligence 122, 
122-23. 
15 DoC in Sport Report (n 1) 4. 
16 M McNamee and S Parry, Ethics & Sport (E & FN Spon, 1998), xvii; H Appenzeller, Ethical Behavior in Sport 
(Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2011) xi. 
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time and space’, with ‘the systematic reflection upon them’ referring to ethics.17  This is 
entirely consistent with Honoré’s submission that morality concerns ‘conduct that has a 
significant impact on other people … and with the restraints on behaviour that we should 
accept because of this. Moral criticism assesses behaviour in the light of its impact on 
others’.18  Given the interdependent relationship between a coach and athlete, and not 
least, in view of recent investigations and controversies, there has rightly been moral 
criticism of some non-recent and contemporary coaching conduct.  Moreover, viewed 
through the prism of descriptive or empirical sports ethics,19 the terms ethics and morality 
appear to sometimes be used interchangeably and might be regarded ‘to mean that aspect 
of human concern related to the incidence of good and evil in people’s lives, and thus too 
the moral duties … that affect such outcomes’.20  Indeed, research in the field of sports 
ethics, including moral issues encountered when coaching sports, makes frequent reference 
to notions of morality, justice, righteousness and virtue.21  More specifically, in 
contemporary sports coaching scholarship it has been suggested ‘that care should not be 
limited to the minimum legal requirement, but … coaches should embrace a more 
aspirational and holistic caring ethic’.22 
 
                                                 
17 M McNamee (ed.), The Ethics of Sport: A Reader (Routledge, 2010) 3. 
18 Honoré (n 7) 2 
19 McNamee (n 17) 3. 
20 R Scott Kretchmar, ‘Soft metaphysics: a precursor to good sports ethics’ in R Simon, The Ethics of Coaching 
Sports: Moral, Social, and Legal Issues (Westview Press, 2013) 20.   
21 Appenzeller, (n 16) xi.   
22 S Roberts et al, ‘Lifting the veil of depression and alcoholism in sport coaching: how do we care for carers? 
(2018) Qualitative Research in Sport, Exercise and Health, 2: DOI: 10.1080/2159676X.2018.1556182. See 
further, R Jones, ‘Coaching as Caring (The Smiling Gallery): Accessing Hidden Knowledge’ (2009) 14(4) Physical 
Education and Sport Pedagogy 377; C Cronin and K. Armour, ‘“Being” in the Coaching World: New Insights on 
Youth Performance Coaching from an Interpretative Phenomenological Approach’ (2017) 22(8) Sport, 
Education and Society 919. 
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In contrast,  and more discretely, when conceptualising law, Lucy succinctly 
recognises that: 
 
law is a more formal and detailed body of standards for conduct than morality, 
dealing with bad outcomes rather than good and which, broadly speaking, maintains 
minimal rather than aspirational standards for conduct.  Given such differences 
between law and morality, it would be folly to assume that legal and moral liability-
responsibility are synonymous, yet equally wrong to think that they never overlap.23 
 
 
Curiously, whilst highlighting important suggested distinctions between law and morality 
that will be subsequently further explored, this passage reaffirms the elusive nature of 
attempts to clearly demarcate the potential overlap between law and morality. Indeed, if 
we employ the concepts of a morality of duty (i.e., legal liability-responsibility), and a 
morality of aspiration (i.e., moral liability-responsibility),  it has been suggested that ‘there is 
neither occasion nor warrant for drawing a clear line between the[se] two moralities’.24  
This article argues otherwise, submitting that a coach’s legal liability and moral 
responsibility vary significantly in scope and content.  Simply applied, a deeper 
understanding of the intersection between the tort of negligence and modern sports 
coaching cautions against conflation of the concepts of legal and moral duties of care.  This 
distinction is of immediate importance and significance when the concept of the duty of 
care is employed in a general manner which fails to appreciate and acknowledge the limits 
set by legal standards of care.  Nonetheless, and as will be argued, this blurring of 
boundaries has the potential to give rise to legal obligations in circumstances where coaches 
assume responsibility for what might otherwise be more accurately regarded as moral 
duties.  It will be contended that this may include duties that should be categorised, from a 
                                                 
23 W Lucy, Philosophy of Private Law (Clarendon Law Series, OUP, 2007) 47. 
24 L Fuller, The Morality of Law (Revised edition, London: Yale University Press, 1969) 10.   
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purely legal standpoint, and prior to the assumption of responsibility for such duties by the 
coach, as falling beyond the direct responsibility of coaches lacking the necessary specialist 
skill, competence, training, qualifications and experience (e.g., administering basic first aid; 
decisions regarding return-to-play following participant injury).  So, whilst courts are no 
doubt alive to distinctions between legal and moral duties of care -- with determination of 
the standard of care in all the circumstances allowing further mitigation of such differences 
by the judiciary, even in situations where the duty test is met -- many sports coaches, 
officials and administrators appear unlikely to be aware of these control measures or 
nuances.  However, and somewhat curiously, a coach sued in negligence for breach of what 
without more might more aptly be viewed as a moral duty of care, and so typically 
extending beyond the reasonable standards ordinarily expected of coaches, may well be 
vulnerable to liability in negligence should the actions of the coach create a legal obligation.  
It is contended that adopting a broad definition of duty of care, as an expression of best 
practice in an extra-legal context, may unwittingly promote the widening of such legal 
obligations and limits.  This scenario appears problematic, not least, since the courts would 
then be tasked with defining the standard of care in the particular circumstances where a 
conflation of moral and legal duties has already essentially been established in law.  Put 
simply, there appears limited recourse in this context for judges to distinguish between 
moral and legal duties of care, for instance, by defining the content of the duty imposed 
(i.e., standard of care) narrowly in order to avoid setting unrealistic standards.  Moreover, 
despite being intended to provide reassurance to volunteers functioning to promote 
desirable activities, including sport, engagement of s.1 Compensation 2006 ‘[i]s not 
concerned with and does not alter the standard of care, nor the circumstances in which a 
 9 
duty to take care will be owed’.25  In this context, the impact of s.1 Compensation Act 2006 
therefore appears to be limited.26  Accordingly, since conflation of legal and moral duties 
may potentially transform moral duties of care into legal obligations, there appears limited 
room for judicial manoeuvre or discretion in order to guard against associated unintended 
and undesirable outcomes.  To more fully develop this point, it proves necessary and 
instructive to examine the doctrinal foundations at the root of this submission. 
 
 
 
Duty of Care or Standard of Care? 
 
Despite both law and morality serving to channel our behaviour,27 moral guilt may 
play little or no role in many cases of liability in negligence.28  A legal rule might be thought 
to be morally desirable, but it in no way follows from this mere fact that it should be 
regarded as a rule of law.29  Lord James made this abundantly clear in Cavalier (Pauper) v 
Pope,30 when stating, ‘[b]ut moral responsibility, however clearly established, is not 
identical with legal liability’.  Conversely, when determining a case concerning the legal 
                                                 
25 Explanatory Notes to the Compensation Act 2006, [11] <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ 
ukpga/2006/29/notes> [Accessed 16 April 2019].  Interestingly, this note speaks to both the imposition of a 
duty of care, and a further control mechanism within the law of negligence, the standard of care.  Arguably, 
this is perhaps somewhat indicative of the limitations of pigeonholing and conclusively separating issues of 
whether to impose a duty and, the standard of reasonable care and skill expected in all the circumstances: see 
generally, Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd v Martin & Co (Contractors) Ltd [1973] QB 27, 37, per Lord Denning MR.   
No doubt, this has the potential to create considerable conceptual confusion in this context, most particularly, 
when duty of care terminology attracts a non-legal meaning but, with clear potential legal implications. 
26 See further, N Partington, ‘Beyond the “Tomlinson trap”: analysing the effectiveness of section 1 of the 
Compensation Act 2006’ (2016) 37(1) Liverpool L Rev 33.  Recent enactment of the Social Action, Responsibility 
and Heroism Act 2015 would appear not to alter this view.  For sustained treatment of the SARAH Act 2015, 
see J Goudkamp, ‘Restating the Common Law? The Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Act 2015’ (2017) 
37 Legal Studies 577. 
27 S Shavell, ‘Law versus Morality as Regulators of Conduct’ (2002) 4(2) American Law and Economics Review 
227, 257. 
28 S Deakin et al., Markesinis and Deakin’s Tort Law (7th ed., OUP, 2013) 43. 
29 Hart (n 9) 626. 
30 [1906] AC 428 (HL). 
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liability of a learner driver in Nettleship v Weston,31 Lord Denning in the Court of Appeal 
found that ‘[m]orally the learner driver is not at fault; but legally she is liable because she is 
insured and the risk should fall on her’.32  Since taking all reasonable care in the 
circumstances appears to exonerate defendants from moral blame,33 as noted by Stevens, 
the (legal) standard of care expected of the learner driver appears somewhat puzzling when 
contrasted with the submission that the law and morality are inextricably interwoven.34  By 
analogy, the issue of coach negligence may be regarded as being of direct relevance to this 
tension.  Should an amateur volunteer sports coach be sued in negligence, since the legal 
test applied would be informed by the principles of professional negligence,35 there appears 
the possibility of a potentially serious disconnect between legal and moral 
blameworthiness.36  This is a sentiment Lord Phillips appeared mindful in Vowles v Evans 
(albeit the defendant being a rugby union referee) when stating:  
 
There is scope for argument as to the extent to which the degree of skill to be 
expected of a referee depends upon the grade of the referee or of the match that he 
has agreed to referee. In the course of argument it was pointed out that sometimes 
in the case of amateur sport, the referee fails to turn up, or is injured in the course of 
the game, and a volunteer referee is called for from the spectators. In such 
circumstances the volunteer cannot reasonably be expected to show the skill of one 
who holds himself out as referee, or perhaps even to be fully conversant with the 
laws of the game.37 
 
                                                 
31 [1971] 2 QB 691 (CA). 
32 Ibid 700. 
33 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (3rd ed., Clarendon Law Series, OUP, 2013) 173. 
34 R Stevens, Torts and Rights (OUP, 2007) 97. 
35 N Partington, ‘Professional liability of amateurs: The context of sports coaching’ (2015) 4 Journal of Personal 
Injury Law 232.  Discussed later. 
36 Partington (n 26) 48-54. 
37 Vowles v Evans [2003] EWCA Civ 318 at [28].  Problematically, this seems to conceal the fact that an 
individual assuming a duty requiring the exercise of a special skill would, in fact, be subject to the ordinary 
principles of the law of negligence if sued.   
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In this scenario described by Lord Phillips, whilst the question of possible legal liability 
appears to remain arguable,38 it would be an altogether more difficult task to regard the 
actions of the volunteer referee (or coach39) as being morally at fault.  Nonetheless, by 
identifying the standard of care, or control device of breach or fault, as the mechanism by 
which the volunteer will be adequately safeguarded from negligence liability, the existence 
of a duty of care seems incontrovertible.  In which case, and as a point previously 
mentioned and subsequently further developed in this article, should assumption of 
responsibility for moral duties by volunteer coaches (and referees) limit the application of 
judicial discretion when defining the standard of care at a reasonable level, the possible 
scope of legal liability becomes materially wider. 
  
The significant distinction between a duty owed in law, and actions deemed morally 
desirable/justifiable in a more general sense, appears to be blurred by the widespread 
modern-day usage of the notion of duty of care.  Importantly, the words ‘duty of care’ are 
frequently ‘used to characterise whatever the speaker thinks should or should not have 
been done by authorities or individuals in a particular set of circumstances’.40  Peculiarly, 
should expressions of duties of care in sport encapsulate both legal and moral duties in this 
fashion, thereby potentially amalgamating what as a matter of legal principle would be 
separate enquiries regarding the duty of care and the standard of care, this may pose 
serious ramifications.  Put simply, the implications of failing to more precisely frame these 
two respective duties, thereby potentially extending the scope of legal responsibility beyond 
                                                 
38 N Partington, ‘“It’s just not cricket”. Or is it? (2016) 32(1) Journal of Professional Negligence 75, 79-80.  See 
further, the approach adopted by HHJ Lopez in Bartlett v English Cricket Board Association of Cricket Officials 
(unreported), County Court (Birmingham), 27 August 2015. 
39 N Partington, ‘Legal liability of coaches: a UK perspective’ (2014) 14(3-4) International Sports Law Journal 
232, 238. 
40 W Norris, ‘A duty of care in sport: what it actually means’ (2017) 3 JPI Law 154.  
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its current constraints,41  may not be obvious to the ordinary reasonable person.  
Accordingly, since it is in law that the notion of a duty of care originates and continues to 
evolve,42 a more precise understanding of its legal roots and, subsequent development 
since the seminal case of Donoghue v Stevenson,43 proves both necessary and fruitful in 
order to better understand distinctions between a coach’s legal and moral duty of care 
towards their athletes.   
Donoghue v Stevenson is best known for ‘introducing into the law a general moral 
principle of “good neighbourliness”’.44  In this House of Lords judgment, Lord Atkin stated: 
The liability for negligence, whether you style it such or treat it as in other systems as 
a species of ‘culpa,’ is no doubt based upon a general public sentiment of moral 
wrongdoing for which the offender must pay.  But acts or omissions which any moral 
code would censure cannot in a practical world be treated so as to give a right to 
every person injured by them to demand relief.  In this way rules of law arise which 
limit the range of complainants and the extent of their remedy.  The rule that you 
are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you must not injure your neighbour; and 
the lawyer’s question, Who is my neighbour? receives a restricted reply.  You must 
take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee 
would be likely to injure your neighbour.  Who, then, in law is my neighbour? The 
answer seems to be – persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that 
I ought reasonably to have then in contemplation as being so affected when I am 
directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question.45 
 
In alluding to Lord Atkin’s carefully chosen and extremely precise language, when 
formulating this said duty, Heuston recognises that ‘[i]t would be a very strange reasonable 
man who could comprehend all its implications and subtleties without instruction from a 
                                                 
41 Ibid 154-55. 
42 Ibid 154. 
43 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562. 
44 M Lunney et al., Tort Law: Text and Materials (6th edition, Oxford University Press, 2017) 117. 
45 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, 580. 
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lawyer’.46  Given the interdependent relationship between a sports coach and athlete, Lord 
Atkin’s ‘neighbour principle’ is clearly relevant in the context of sports coaching.47  Simply 
applied, the law of negligence’s control mechanism of duty would tend to be 
straightforwardly satisfied in the circumstances of organised sporting activities led by 
coaches.  But, also of central relevance to the application of this principle in a claim in 
negligence, are the associated restrictions that define the content or extent of the duty 
owed (i.e., standard of care).  This endorses a central aim of this article, namely, unpacking 
and scrutinising the subtleties of a concept, where at first glance, legal and moral duties of 
care may intuitively appear to overlap and be inextricably interwoven.  Moreover, given the 
apparent increasing tendency to refer to the concept of duty of care in order to create a 
‘veneer of pseudo-legal authority’,48 it is submitted that greater consideration should be 
given to the seemingly concealed consequences of an uncritical and unwitting conflation of 
legal and moral duties of care.  As indicated above, this poses curious and significant 
implications when the notion of the duty of care assumes both an extra-legal and legal 
meaning, thereby perhaps setting in motion a peculiar interplay between moral duties of 
care and legal standards of care.   
A shift from moral standards 
Since the law of negligence is fluid and dynamic, reflecting variations in the 
prevailing ‘social conditions and habits of life’,49 a more current consideration of its 
development and application reveals a significant shift from its origins as a general moral 
                                                 
46 R Heuston, ‘Donoghue v Stevenson in Retrospect’ (1957) 20(1) Modern Law Review, 1, 16. 
47 D Griffith-Jones and N Randall, ‘Civil Liability Arising Out of Participation in Sport’ in A Lewis and J Taylor, 
Sport: Law and Practice (3rd ed., Tottel, 2014) 1638-39; Beloff et al (n 11), 146. 
48 Norris (n 40). 
49 R Percy and C Walton (eds) Charlesworth & Percy on Negligence (9th ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 1997) [6-04]. 
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principle.  Interestingly, Lord Atkin himself was acutely aware of distinctions between law 
and morality, recognising prior to his speech in Donoghue v Stevenson that: 
It is quite true that the law and morality do not cover identical fields.  No doubt 
morality extends beyond the more limited range in which you can lay down the 
definite prohibitions of law; but, apart from that, the British law has always 
necessarily ingrained in it moral teaching in this sense: that it lays down standards of 
honesty and plain dealing between man and man.50 
 
 
More recently, it has been argued that basing negligence liability upon a general public 
sentiment of moral wrongdoing ‘takes a wholly exaggerated view of the degree to which the 
legal concept of carelessness is based on moral fault and pays no regard at all to the aims of 
loss shifting and accident prevention’.51  Put simply, since Lord Atkin’s celebrated dictum, 
there has been a ‘transformation of the notion of negligence from a concept with strong 
moral overtones into a legal notion in which wider policy considerations determine the 
existence of a duty to take care, its breach, and even the extent of the consequences’.52  
This apparent general erosion of the weight afforded by courts to moral codes, when 
determining cases brought in negligence, has created a certain amount of conceptual 
confusion for lawyers.53  Such a lack of clarity may also perhaps have contributed to a 
framing of the concept of the duty of care in a more general and overarching sense outside 
of the law by non-lawyers.  Moreover, since the legal test of negligence concerns what 
ought to be done in the particular circumstances, presuming a duty of care is found to be 
owed, it may still be regarded as an ethical concept.54  As such, it is little wonder that, for 
instance, Baroness Tanni Grey-Thompson, having been asked by the Minister of Sport to 
                                                 
50 Lord Atkin, ‘Law as an Educational Subject’ (1932) J Soc’y Pub Tchrs L 27, 30. 
51 Deakin et al. (n 28) 248. 
52 Ibid 50. 
53 Ibid. 
54 J Montrose, ‘Is Negligence an Ethical or a Sociological Concept?’ (1958) 21 Modern Law Review 259. 
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examine issues surrounding the ‘so-called “Duty of Care” that sports have towards their 
participants’, adopted a deliberately broad definition.   
 
It appears uncontroversial to accept that engaging moral considerations may very 
well prove instructive in establishing what the law ought to be.55  Conversely, in providing 
valuable reinforcement to morality,56 law might be regarded as acting as a ‘moral 
educator’.57  However, and in cautioning against conflating moral standards with legal 
requirements, Weir observes that whist there may be an ‘understandable urge to bring legal 
standards up to those of delicate morality’ this ‘should be resisted, or there would be no 
room for generosity or for people to go beyond the call of legal duty’.58  More bluntly, there 
remains no legal compulsion for individuals to display the excellences of which they might 
be capable when interacting with others, requiring the law to turn to ‘its blood cousin, the 
morality of duty’ (as distinct from the previously mentioned morality of aspiration) for 
workable standards of judgement (i.e., defining the standard of care).59  Crucially, this 
speaks to the fact that law may in actual fact often represent the lowest denominator of 
behavioural standards, whereas morality establishes higher behavioural standards.60  
Conversely, it is not always necessary, in order to satisfy widely accepted moral 
requirements, to do what is legally required.61  Such a ‘separation thesis’62 has important 
ramifications for the duty of care incumbent upon modern sports coaches.  For instance, 
                                                 
55 Cane (n 8) 14; Law Reform Commission of Ireland, Civil Liability of Good Samaritans and Volunteers (LRC 93, 
2009) [2.07]. 
56 Ibid 15. 
57 J Braithwaite, ‘Negotiation versus Litigation: Industry Regulation in Great Britain and the United States’ 
(1987) American Bar Foundation Research J 559, cited in Cane (n 8) 15. 
58 J Weir, An Introduction to Tort Law (2nd ed., Clarendon Law Series, Oxford University Press, 2006) 1. 
59 Fuller, (n 24) 9. 
60 J Herring, Medical law and ethics (5th ed., OUP, 2014) 3. 
61 Honoré (n 7) 17. 
62 Cane (n 6) 60.  
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should the deliberately broad definition of the concept of the duty of care in the DoC in  
Sport Report gain unquestioning traction, the contended (moral) aspirations with regard to 
issues including the transition of athletes through the system (i.e., entering and leaving top-
level sport), education (i.e., in football academies), mental welfare concerns and, of most 
present concern, safety, injury and medical issues, appears likely to extend the scope of the 
duty of care incumbent upon modern sports coaches.63  
 
No-duty-to-assist 
 
Perhaps the strongest illustration of the distinction between moral and legal duties 
concerns the void of a legal duty to rescue a stranger in distress at common law.64  This is 
despite whatever moral decency may require, the seriousness of the emergency or, the 
ease in which effective assistance may be rendered.65  In Stovin v Wise,66 Lord Nicholls 
provided a number of classic examples to illustrate this point that are worth recalling in full: 
 
The classic example of the absence of a legal duty to take positive action is where a 
grown person stands by while a young child drowns in a shallow pool. Another 
instance is where a person watches a nearby pedestrian stroll into the path of an 
oncoming vehicle. In both instances the callous bystander can foresee serious injury 
if he does nothing. He does not control the source of the danger, but he has control 
of the means to avert a dreadful accident. The child or pedestrian is dependent on 
the bystander: the child is unable to save himself, and the pedestrian is unaware of 
his danger. The prospective injury is out of all proportion to the burden imposed by 
having to take preventive steps. All that would be called for is the simplest exertion 
or a warning shout. 
 
Despite this, the recognised legal position is that the bystander does not owe the 
drowning child or the heedless pedestrian a duty to take steps to save him. 
Something more is required than being a bystander. There must be some additional 
                                                 
63 See generally, Norris (n 40) 155, noting that in this context there is a need to be careful what we wish for. 
64 J Barr Ames, ‘Law and Morals’ (1908) 22 Harvard Law Review 97, 109; Q Bu, ‘The Good Samaritan in the 
Chinese Society: Morality vis-à-vis Law’ (2017) 38 Liverpool Law Review 135, 144. 
65 K Williams, ‘Doctors as Good Samaritans: Some Empirical Evidence Concerning Emergency Medical 
Treatment in Britain’ (2003) 30 Journal of Law & Society 258, 258-59.  
66 [1996] AC 923, 931. 
 17 
reason why it is fair and reasonable that one person should be regarded as his 
brother's keeper and have legal obligations in that regard. When this additional 
reason exists, there is said to be sufficient proximity.   
 
A further widely cited example of this nature is provided in Yuen Kun Yeu and Others 
v Attorney-General of Hong Kong,67 where Lord Keith makes plain that there would not be 
liability in negligence should an individual refrain from shouting a warning to a stranger 
about to walk over a cliff with his head in the air.68  No matter how grievous the 
consequences may be to others, individuals are fully entitled to do nothing in the absence of 
a legally recognised duty.69  Simply applied:  
When a person has done nothing to put himself in any relationship with another 
person in distress or with his property mere accidental propinquity does not require 
him to go to that person’s assistance. There may be a moral duty to do so, but it is 
not practicable to make it a legal duty.70 
 
Clearly, UK courts take the view that the general no-duty-to-assist rule in English common 
law makes ‘good sense’,71  it being ‘one thing to disapprove of and criticise failure to rescue 
but another to impose legal liability and to award monetary compensation for failing to 
rescue’.72  In echoing the sentiments of Lord Reid in Dorset Yacht Company v Home Office, it 
is contended that it is both impracticable and undesirable to equate the moral duties of 
sports coaches with their legal duties of care.  Defining and subjecting a coach’s duty of care 
to detailed scrutiny illustrates the importance of this fundamental distinction. 
 
 
Duty of Care of Modern Sports Coaches 
 
                                                 
67 [1988] AC 175. 
68 Ibid 192.  Also see, Norris (n 40) 155. 
69 Heuston (n 47) 18. 
70 Dorset Yacht Company v Home Office [1970] AC 1004, 1027 (Lord Reid). 
71 Kent v Griffiths [2001] QB 36 (CA) [18]-[19]; R Mulheron, Principles of Tort Law (CUP, 2016) 99.   
72 Cane (n 6) 74. 
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Modern sports coaches are under a legal duty of care to adopt objectively 
reasonable coaching practice, in the prevailing circumstances, so that athletes are 
reasonably safe and not exposed to unreasonable risk of personal injury.73  In view of the 
specialist skill required of coaches, and consistent with the legal principles established in 
instances of professional negligence,74 this duty demands a standard of care and skill 
consistent with the ordinarily competent coach occupying the same role and/or coaching at 
the same level.75   When defining this said duty, or more precisely, the required standard of 
objective reasonable coaching practice, considerable weight would be attached to regular 
and approved coaching practices advocated by a responsible coaching organisation or 
National Governing Body (NGB).76  There is also a corresponding requirement for such 
endorsed practice to be logically justifiable.77  The most recent reported judgment regarding 
coach negligence in the UK proves informative and helpful in illustrating the practical 
application of these principles in context. 
 
In Shone v British Bobsleigh Limited,78 the essence of the claim was that the British 
Bobsleigh and Skeleton Association (BBSA), essentially through the actions of its coaches:79  
owed the claimant a duty to take reasonable care for her safety, and that it 
negligently allowed the claimant to ride as brakeman in a two-man bobsleigh which 
had not been customised for her, or at least which did not enable her to brace 
herself adequately within the bobsleigh by holding on to handles and by pressing her 
                                                 
73 Partington (n 12). 
74 Partington (n 35). 
75 Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1987] QB 730. 
76 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582.  For instance, coaching manuals and 
guidelines published by Sports Governing Bodies. 
77 Bolitho v City of Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232. 
78 Shone v British Bobsleigh Limited, Swindon County Court, 11 May 2018. 
79 Ibid at [67]: It being accepted ‘on behalf of the BBSA that the level of control which it exercised over the 
bobsleigh teams was sufficient to impute liability to it for the actions of its coaches, especially Mr Woolley’.  
Mr Woolley the GB Performance Coach (at [43]) had ‘been involved in training the claimant at Bath and in 
managing her training and performance’ (at [50]). 
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feet against foot pegs or against the back of the driver's seat, as a result of which she 
suffered injury in the crash.80 
 
With specific regard to the scope of the BBSA’s duty of care, developed through discussions 
between experienced counsel during the trial, it was held ‘that it owed a duty of care to the 
claimant to take all reasonable actions to ensure she was reasonably safe in the course of 
her activities on the bobsleigh run, in accordance with the prevailing standard of reasonable 
practice in the sport of national bobsleigh’.81  In defining the required standard of care of 
the coach in the prevailing circumstances, and ultimately finding a breach of duty by the 
BBSA, HHJ Parkes ruled: 
It seems to me quite clear, on my findings of fact, that the BBSA, through Mr 
Woolley [GB Performance Coach], breached its duty to the claimant by allowing a 
frightened novice to go down the run from the top start when (to his knowledge) she 
could not brace with either hands or feet and felt unsafe to slide.82  
 
Put simply, and as illustrated in Shone v British Bobsleigh Limited, the duty of a coach is 
premised on the notion of reasonableness.  As such, the duty of a coach is to adopt 
reasonable coaching practice so that reasonable care is taken to ensure the reasonable 
safety of athletes.  This reasonableness standard is strikingly fact-sensitive,83 and as a legal 
test, reasonableness may be regarded as an elusive, vague and somewhat woolly notion 
which fails to provide much by way of guidance when attempts are made to define the 
standard of care.84  Indeed, as succinctly noted by the Court of Appeal when determining a 
sports negligence case, ‘the issue of negligence cannot be resolved in a vacuum. It is fact 
                                                 
80 Ibid at [2]. 
81 Ibid at [4].  The prevailing standard of reasonable practice in the sport of national bobsleigh being indicative 
of the Bolam test and reflective of an instance of professional negligence. 
82 Ibid at [68].  For a further framing of the legal test for breach of duty in cases of coach negligence, see 
Morrow v Dungannon and South Tyrone BC [2012] NIQB 50 at [20]. 
83 W Norris, ‘The duty of care to prevent personal injury’ (2009) 2 JPI Law 126. 
84 R Clancy, ‘Judo Mats, Climbing Walls, Trampolines and Pole Vaulters’ (1995) 3(1) Sport and the Law Journal 
28. 
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specific’.85  Moreover, since sports coaching involves a ‘continua of highly complex, context-
dependent and historically situated behaviours’,86 ascertaining precise moral and ethical 
duties of coaches also appears somewhat problematic.  Further, given the assumption that 
ethical considerations regarding coaching practice will be understood and grasped 
intuitively by coaches,87 by analogy, the DoC in Sport Report’s broad definition of duty of 
care may similarly promote intuitive expectations of coaches.  As an aspirational expression 
reflective of best practice, it appears incontrovertible that the Report’s terminology in 
relation to duty of care is geared towards an improvement in coaching standards and 
practice.  However, as this article argues, should such implicit assumptions fail to reflect and 
account for the more subtle nuances between moral and legal obligations, this may 
unwittingly expose coaches to a greater risk of legal liability by potentially extending the 
scope of legal responsibility beyond its current limits.  Most obviously, it may result in 
coaches assuming duties which may not presently be expected of them.  Should this be the 
case, it appears likely there would be a legal expectation for such duties to be discharged 
properly, regardless of coaches being categorised as amateur, professional, ‘professional 
amateur’, qualified, (in)experienced or accredited by a National Governing Body of sport.88 
 
Standards of Care in Coaching 
 
                                                 
85 Caldwell v Maguire and Fitzgerald [2001] EWCA Civ 1054 at [30].  This echoes Lord Steyn’s earlier submission 
that ‘[i]n law context is everything’ (Regina (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 2 AC 
532 at [28]).  
86 AR Hardman and CR Jones, ‘Sports coaching and virtue ethics’ in A Hardman and C Jones, The Ethics of 
Sports Coaching (Routledge, 2011) 78. 
87 H Telfer, ‘Coaching practice and practice ethics’ in J Lyle and C Cushion (eds), Sports coaching: 
professionalisation and practice pages (Churchill Livingstone Elsevier, 2010) 210-11. 
88 Partington (n 35) 242 
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Although terminology associated with ‘specific (legal) duties’ may be regarded as 
technically misleading,89 since the precise degree and scope of responsibilities owed by 
coaches more accurately defines the standard of care, as noted by Clerk and Lindsell on 
Torts, this can be useful in a descriptive way.90  So whilst the standard expected of sports 
coaches is fixed conceptually as the duty to take reasonable care, specific duties required of 
coaches have evolved.91  As a result of advances brought about by factors including those in 
the field of sports science, technical developments in certain sports, and societal 
expectations, such legal duties appear to be broadening.92  Importantly, such advances may 
increase the scope and degree of the duty of care owed by progressively placing more 
responsibilities on coaches.93  Correspondingly, as athletes progress to elite and excellence 
levels the required emphasis on more specialised training programmes creates new risks 
requiring coaches to ensure that they possess the necessary competence and expertise to 
operate safely in these amended circumstances.94  Moreover, there may also be general 
improvements in the standards of skill and care provided by particular professions, 
regardless of associated advances in knowledge, similarly heightening the standard of the 
reasonably competent practitioner.95  Accordingly, as the principles of coaching are 
constantly assessed and revised,96 so too is the legal standard of care required of coaches.97 
                                                 
89 The duty remains that of reasonable care to ensure the reasonable safety of athletes.   
90 MA Jones and AM Dugdale (eds) Clerk and Lindsell on Torts (20th ed., Sweet and Maxwell, 2010) [8-137].  
91 A McCaskey and K Biedzynski, ‘A Guide to the Legal Liability of Coaches for a Sports Participant's Injuries’ 
(1996) 6 Seton Hall J. Sport L. 7, 15. 
92 R VerSteeg, ‘Negligence in the Air: Safety, Legal Liability, and the Pole Vault’ (2003) 4 Tex. Rev. Ent. & Sports 
L. 109, 113.     
93 J Labuschagne and J Skea, ‘The Liability of a Coach for a Sport Participant’s Injury’ (1999) 10 Stellenbosch Law 
Review 158. 
94 Ibid 166.   
95 J Powell and R Stewart, Jackson and Powell on Professional Liability (7th ed., Sweet and Maxwell, 2012) [2-
135].   
96 T Cassidy et al, Understanding Sports Coaching: The Social, Cultural and Pedagogical Foundations of 
Coaching Practice (2nd ed., Routledge, 2009) 130-31. 
97 See generally, Powell and Stewart (n 95) [2-135]. 
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This is due to reasons both devoid (i.e., sport scientific and technical developments) and 
inclusive (i.e., societal expectations) of social and moral considerations.  In general, the 
emerging case law in the UK reveals that the specific duties of coaches when managing the 
risk of injury to athletes predominantly relates to the reasonableness of supervision, 
training and instruction.98  With this in mind, the following example offers a stark illustration 
of possible unintended consequences when conflation of legal and moral duties of care 
blurs the distinction between duty of care and standard of care considerations. 
 
Volunteering is commonplace and generally ‘expected’ in the provision of 
community and recreational sport.99  The vast majority of sports coaches in the UK are 
volunteers,100 this being reflective of the bulk of countries in the world.101 Individual 
volunteers at community sports clubs may willingly embrace a social or moral duty to 
support and assist other club members by organising, for instance, practice sessions for 
junior or less experienced players.  In such a situation, it appears highly probable that such 
volunteers will on occasion assume the responsibility for not only arranging the practice 
session but also supervising it and, if competent and experienced players (as opposed to 
coaches) themselves, providing some level of instruction.  In such a scenario, and following 
                                                 
98 E.g., Shone v British Bobsleigh Limited, Swindon County Court, 11 May 2018; Ahmed v MacLean [2016] EWHC 
2798 (QB); Morrow v Dungannon and South Tyrone BC [2012] NIQB 50; MacIntyre v Ministry of Defence [2011] 
EWHC 1690 (QB); Davenport v Farrow [2010] EWHC 550 (QB); Anderson v Lyotier [2008] EWHC 2790 (QB); Brady 
v Sunderland Association Football Club Ltd 17 November 1998 (CA); Fowles v Bedfordshire CC [1996] ELR 51 (CA). 
See further, Partington (n 39).  Given the close analogy, cases from the context of Physical Education teaching 
also prove instructive in determining the specific duties of sports coaches.  See, for instance: Goulding v Doherty 
[2017] NIQB 47; Murray v McCullough [2016] NIQB 52; Hammersley-Gonsalves v Redcar and Cleveland BC [2012] 
EWCA Civ 1135; Mountford v Newlands School [2007] EWCA Civ 21; Van Oppen v Clerk to the Bedford Charity 
Trustees [1989] 3 All ER 389 (CA). 
99 C Nash, ‘Volunteering in Sports Coaching – A Tayside Study’ in M Graham and M Foley (eds), Volunteering in 
Leisure: Marginal or Inclusive? (LSA, 2001) 44. 
100 sports coach UK, ‘Coach Tracking Study: A four-year study of coaching in the UK’ (2012) 17.  
101 P Duffy et al., ‘Sport coaching as a “profession”: challenges and future directions’ (2011) 5(2) International 
Journal of Coaching Science 93, 94. 
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Fowles v Bedfordshore CC,102 the existence of an assumption of responsibility by the 
volunteer ‘coach’, and reliance on this supervision and/or instruction by the younger or 
more inexperienced players, would most typically give rise to a common law duty of care.  
Simply applied, the initial social or moral duty assumed by the volunteer ‘coach’, perhaps 
underpinned by altruistic motivations103 and an associated aspirational and holistic caring 
ethic,104 would appear to be transformed into a more formal legal duty of care should 
‘specialist’ advice be offered and acted upon.  As noted by Gardiner, since the volunteer 
‘coach’ would provide ‘gratuitous advice on a matter within his particular skill or knowledge, 
and knows or ought to have known that the person asking for the advice will rely on it and 
act accordingly’, a duty of care at common law would be established.105  Consequently, the 
standard of care required of the volunteer ‘coach’ in these amended circumstances would 
be commensurate with that of the ordinarily competent coach.  Put bluntly, the original 
social or moral duty is extended to become a more formalised duty to adopt reasonable 
coaching practice so that reasonable care is taken to ensure the reasonable safety of players 
(i.e., fellow club members).  For the average reasonable club member, player and/or parent, 
                                                 
102 Fowles v Bedfordshire CC [1996] ELR 51 (CA), and most notably, the judgment of Millett LJ, P60-P64.  This 
proposition was endorsed by the Court of Appeal in the later decision of Poppleton v Trustees of the 
Portsmouth Youth Activities Committee [2008] EWCA Civ 646 at [17], per May LJ.  Also see, Norris (n 40), 157.  
More recently, this line of reasoning was adopted by counsel for the claimant in Petrou v Bertoncello [2012] 
EWHC 2286 (QB) at [22] and [27]. 
103 See, for instance, Law Reform Commission of Ireland (n 55) [2.79], noting that ‘in the main, volunteers 
usually act for altruistic reasons and because they have a moral, rather than legal, duty …’.  
104 Roberts et al (n 22). 
105 J Gardiner, ‘Should Coaches Take Care?’ (1993) 143 NLJ 1598.  Interestingly, this principle derived from 
Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partner Ltd [1964] AC 465 rests on an assumption of responsibility by the 
defendant towards the claimant and is coupled by the claimant’s reliance on the exercise by the defendant of 
due skill and care.  The principle has been applied by the courts to a range of scenarios extending beyond mere 
negligent misstatements.  In recently reiterating this ‘underlying wider principle’, Lord Toulson in the Supreme 
Court in Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2015] UKSC 2 at [67] repeated that ‘[t]he principle 
that a duty of care could arise in that way was not limited to a case concerned with the giving of information 
and advice (Hedley Byrne) but could include the performance of other services’.  See further, S Peyer and R 
Heywood, ‘Walking on thin ice: the perception of tortious liability rules and the effect on altruistic behaviour’ 
(2019) Legal Studies 1–18, 6. https://doi.org/10.1017/lst.2018.39.   
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without up-to-date training or a coaching qualification, this may well represent a surprising 
exposure to legal liability, and an unusual instance of professional negligence, should the 
duty of care be breached.  More fundamentally, it signifies a realistic and important 
illustration of the necessity to explicitly distinguish between legal and moral/social duties of 
care in the context of sports coaching.  On more searching examination of the context of 
sports coaching, appreciation of this crucial distinction becomes even more pronounced.   
 
Sports Coaching Practice 
 
Protecting the health and safety of athletes poses coaches with legal, moral and 
ethical obligations.106  For instance, bullying coaches violate their moral duty, both to treat 
athletes with respect and dignity and, safeguard athletes’ welfare, health and safety.107  
Correspondingly, the dividing line between training intended to maximise sporting 
potential, as contrasted with abuse or exploitation of athletes, appears to be a thin one.108  
A significant ethical dilemma facing modern sports coaches, not least when working with 
young athletes, concerns determination of training intensity levels.109  This is generally a 
judgement call left to the discretion of individual coaches, based on the specific 
circumstances, and an area where coaches have to be trusted to make the right (or 
                                                 
106 R Simon, ‘Coaching, Compliance, and the Law’ in Simon (n 20) 188; M Mitten, ‘The Coach and the Safety of 
Athletes: Ethical and Legal Issues’ in Simon (n 20) 232. 
107 M Hamilton, ‘Coaching, Gamesmanship, and Intimidation’ in Simon (n 20) 144. 
108 P David, ‘Sharp practice: Intensive training and child abuse’ in McNamee (n 17) 426. 
109 See, for instance, A Miles and R Tong, ‘Sports Medicine For Coaches’ in RL Jones and K Kingston (eds) An 
Introduction to Sports Coaching: Connecting Theory to Practice (2nd ed., Routledge, 2013) 188-89; J Lyle, 
Sports Coaching Concepts: A Framework for Coaches’ Behaviour (Routledge, 2002) 240.  Also see, Davenport v 
Farrow [2010] EWHC 550 (QB) at [59], where based on the defendant's training log, the intensity of training 
expected of the claimant was found to be within the range of acceptable coaching (level 4) for an athlete of his 
ability and aspirations.  Interestingly, Norris (n 40, 158) notes that ‘[w]hat may be perfectly acceptable 
treatment of a seasoned professional may be wholly inadequate when dealing with a vulnerable teenager. … it 
is commonplace that coaches or clubs may expect their players to "go through the pain barrier" or "run off" an 
injury or to continue to play having taken pain-killing injections or drugs but without much regard for the 
harmful long-term consequences’. 
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reasonable) decisions.110  Further contentious issues concern the scope of the duty of 
coaches to protect athletes from themselves,111 and determination of what constitutes 
reasonable encouragement when reintroducing previously injured athletes into activities 
and training,112 with the scenario of an injured star athlete desperate to compete a 
challenging dilemma frequently encountered by coaches.113  Moreover, coaches are 
expected to deliver ‘cutting edge’ guidance and advice to athletes,114 potentially challenging 
the threshold between harm and reasonable endeavour when pushing the human body to 
its physical and emotional limits within training and performance.115  Viewed from a legal 
perspective, this provides a clear illustration of the need for coaches to have regard to ‘the 
likely boundary between coaches forging champions or committing a tort’,116  and 
moreover, the requirement for coaching practice and behaviours to be reasonable.  The DoC 
in Sport Report appears to be acutely aware of such tensions in coaching when stating: 
 
While a concentration on qualifications is important it should be noted that being 
qualified to teach a technical skill does not always mean having the appropriate skills 
to work with athletes (of any age) in sport.  Having the responsibility for 
safeguarding participants’ emotional, psychological and physical well-being means 
that those individuals require continuous professional development in these areas.  
There should be a greater focus on behaviours and keeping up to date with relevant 
information.117 
 
 
                                                 
110 Cassidy et al (n 96) 154-55. 
111 Hartley (n 11) 89. 
112 A Hecht, ‘Legal and Ethical Aspects of Sports-Related Concussions: The Merril Hoge story’ (2002) 12 Seton 
Hall J. Sports L. 17, 40-41. 
113 D Healey, Sport and the Law (4th ed., UNSW Press, 2009) 156. 
114 C Mallett, ‘Becoming a high performing coach: pathways and communities’ in Lyle and Cushion (n 87) 119.  
115 Telfer (n 87) 214.  As noted by Telfer, this is certainly an enduring debate, particularly in relation to the 
coaching of young performers. 
116 T Hurst and J Knight, ‘Coaches’ liability for athletes’ injuries and deaths’ (2003) 13 Seton Hall J. Sports L. 27, 
29. 
117 Doc in Sport Report (n 1) 21. 
 26 
 Clearly, this benchmark of reasonable, ethical, or morally justifiable coaching 
conduct and practice, and associated tensions and difficult borderline cases, remain a 
constant source of enquiry and curiosity which coaches have a responsibility to be mindful 
of.118  Interestingly, in the same way in which it may be acceptable to use the terms ethics 
and morality interchangeably, a coach’s moral and ethical obligation not to expose athletes 
to unacceptable levels of risk is ‘[c]onsistent with the legal duty of reasonable care 
established by the negligence standard’.119  However, and of absolutely crucial relevance, is 
the fact that the moral and ethical obligations incumbent upon coaches are broader than 
the legal standard of care.120  Consistent with what Raz labels the ‘semantic thesis’, in the 
context of the duty of care owed by a sports coach to those under the coach’s charge, the 
term duty ‘cannot be used in the same meaning in legal and moral contexts’.121   
It has been suggested that, technically speaking, this is not so much a difference of 
meaning but, ‘a difference between formal, institutionally recognised duties and rights [i.e., 
legal context] and their informal, non-institutional equivalents [i.e., moral context]’.122  
Herein lies the fundamental and dangerous pitfall which appears likely to pose significant 
unintended repercussions unless it is made more explicit and transparent.  Certainly, when 
adopting a deliberately broad expression in the DoC in Sport Report, and in much of the 
subsequent and continuing media coverage in this field,123 the crucial distinction between 
formal and institutionally recognised legal duties, as contrasted with informal and non-
institutional moral duties, is not made plain.  But, in elaborating on the earlier caveat 
                                                 
118 Partington (n 12).  
119 Mitten (n 106) 216. 
120 Ibid 232; Lucy (n 23) 47 
121 J Raz, 'Legal Positivism and the Sources of Law' in J Raz, The Authority of Law. Essays on Law and Morality 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) 38 
122 T Honoré, ‘The Necessary Connection between Law and Morality’ (2002) 22(3) Oxford J Legal Studies 489. 
123 E.g., D Roan, ‘Player welfare: How big a problem is football facing? And what is being done?’ (BBC News, 10 
August 2018) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/football/45171563> accessed 17 July 2019. 
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alluded to by Heuston, when exposed to sustained scrutiny from a legal perspective, the 
critically informed reasonable coach may be somewhat surprised and alarmed when the 
potential ramifications of associated inferences is revealed.  Indeed, in emphasising the 
significance of this distinction in the context of sport, Norris convincingly cautions against 
framing policies in terms of expressions of ‘duty of care’, given the possible associated 
enhanced exposure to negligence liability claims.124  In this regard, perhaps ministers and 
sports bodies need to be alerted to the importance of employing more precise terminology, 
given the important dividing line between legal and moral duties of care. 
 
 
Implications 
 
As already mentioned, the vast majority of the volunteer coaches in the UK have limited 
training,125 with approximately half of the coaches in this jurisdiction not holding a coaching 
qualification.126  Previous experience as players and enthusiasm are often regarded as 
sufficient prerequisites for volunteer coaches.127  Further, there is evidence to suggest that 
some parents volunteer as coaches to assist their children, thereby ensuring that 
opportunities to participate continue.128  This commitment and desire to help by former 
athletes and parents at the entry level is representative of the motivations widely held in 
voluntary activity.129  In short, the sports coaching ‘workforce’ may be regarded as largely 
                                                 
124 Norris (n 40) 155. 
125 G Nygaard and T Boone, Coaches’ guide to sport law (Human Kinetics, 1985) 13.  
126 sports coach UK (n 98) 17. The national average of coaches holding a coaching qualification in 2012 being 
around 53%. 
127 Healey (n 113) 159.  
128 Nash (n 99) 51. Also see, R Groom et al, ‘Volunteering Insight: Report for Sport England’ (Manchester 
Metropolitan University, 2014) 6. In addition to child involvement, other motivating factors for volunteers (not 
necessarily coaches), included: love of sport, giving something back to sport, social connection, career 
aspirations, and education/employment based volunteering. 
129 A Lynn and J Lyle, ‘Coaching workforce development’ in Lyle and Cushion (n 87) 206. 
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unregulated and absent of a ‘validated threshold level of expertise or a commonality of 
occupational practice and expectations’.130   Despite this, it appears axiomatic that coaches 
are driven by social and moral considerations, this being at the very core of the notion of 
the volunteer ethic.131 
Importantly, as the principal supervisors of organised sporting activities, coaches must 
appreciate that participation in sport frequently leads to injury.132  Theme 7 of the DoC in 
Sport Report concentrates on ‘Safety, injury and medical issues’.  Recommendations from 
Theme 7 include:  
 
• Development of a standard first aid course specifically for sport. 
• Sports to provide guidance to clubs with understanding their health and safety 
obligations. 
• NGBs (National Governing Bodies of Sport) to provide and promote online access to 
basic first aid guidance (which should include CPR and concussion protocols). 
• Consideration should be given to the development of a training module including 
content about Sudden Cardiac Arrest (SCA) symptoms.  
• NGBs to work together on improving awareness of cardiac screening at community 
sport level. Consideration should be given to producing online materials and also 
inclusion in coaching courses or participant inductions.  
• All sports (even those who may not be readily thought susceptible to concussion) 
need to be aware of concussion protocols and work together to ensure they have 
something in place and communicate with other organisations.  
• All contact sports to consider pre-season concussion awareness courses.133  
 
 
                                                 
130 Ibid 205.  
131 See, for instance, Study on Volunteering in the European Union (2010), Report for DG EAC submitted by 
GHK, 149 <http://ec.europa.eu/citizenship/pdf/doc1018_en.pdf> accessed 3 January 2019.  The report notes 
that the desire to help others is a key motivating factor amongst volunteers. 
132 Miles and Tong (n 109) 178. 
133 DoC in Sport Report (n 1) 25. 
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Coaches generally operate in isolation,134 without immediate access to the services of a 
doctor or physiotherapist, this being a common situation in amateur sport.135  Moreover, 
there is no requirement in the UK at present for coaches to have first aid or life-support 
training,136 despite the coach frequently being the first person to attend to an injured 
athlete.137  Understanding the health and safety obligations of coaches demands a clear 
distinction between duties maintaining minimal rather than aspirational standards for 
conduct.  Should all coaches be required to attend a standard first aid course specifically for 
sport (and appropriately supported in order to do so), the standard of care required when 
dealing with safety, injury and medical issues involving athletes may, quite deliberately and 
understandably, become explicitly heightened.  For instance, using the analogy of sport 
managers, should the use of automated external defibrillators (AEDs) continue to become 
more commonplace, ‘the bar will continue to be raised regarding the standard of care that 
organizations and facilities are expected to provide’.138  Put simply, formalised standard first 
aid training should equip coaches with an ordinary level of competence that satisfies a ‘basic 
level of awareness among those on the scene about what immediate action to take, 
whether that be calling for further assistance or administering basic first aid’.139  
Significantly, by providing appropriate and mandatory training, the extent of the coach’s 
duty of care would be extended in confined situations in a deliberate, informed and 
incremental fashion.  However, whilst it appears strongly desirable for coaches to be 
                                                 
134 P Trudel et al, ‘Coach education and effectiveness’ in Lyle and Cushion (n 87) 141.  
135 M McNamee et al, ‘Concussion in Sport: Conceptual and Ethical issues’ (2015) 4 Kinesiology Review 190, 
199.   
136 Miles and Tong (n 109) 189. In this scenario, it would be reasonable for the coach to have contingency plans 
in place for the management of foreseeable risk, and make appropriate and timely referral to a qualified 
medical practitioner or nominated first aider.   
137 See, for instance, S Broglio et al, ‘Concussion occurrence and knowledge in Italian football (soccer)’ (2010) 9 
Journal of Sports Science and Medicine 418, 419-20.  
138 J Spengler et al, Risk Management in Sport and Recreation (Human Kinetics, 2006) 64.  
139 DoC in Sport Report (n 1) 26. 
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educated on CPR, concussion and SCA symptoms and protocols, at present, and very much 
depending upon the particular circumstances (i.e., professional v amateur sport; type of 
sport), this does not always appear to be the case.  As such, and  reflective of the more 
general necessity for (volunteer) coaches to only assume legal obligations commensurate 
with their level of competence, a number of the DoC in Sport Report Recommendations 
should be regarded as ‘good practice – an expression of a moral, but certainly not a legal, 
duty’.140   
 
Consequently, when defining the duty of care incumbent upon sports coaches, it is 
imperative that a distinction is drawn between a legal duty of care, as opposed to, broader 
moral, ethical and aspirational considerations.  Failing this, and consistent with the 
volunteer ethic, it appears feasible that intuitively moral and social duties may be 
transformed from aspirational standards of conduct, into legal ones, in a somewhat 
haphazard and informal manner.  Clearly, this would result in the unintended consequence 
of potentially exposing coaches to a greater risk of negligence liability.  In principle, 
extending the scope of a coach’s duty of care should be done in more systematically 
planned and explicit manner.  At the very least, this should involve a process of informed 
dialogue,141 coach education and qualification, continuing ‘professional’ development and, 
corresponding support so that such provision and measures are accessible for all coaches.  
Moreover, the DoC in Sport Report recognises that ‘[a]n understanding of Duty of Care 
should be included in any leadership training in sport, in order to help and support a new 
diverse generation of leaders’.142  Accordingly, the necessity for such training to address and 
                                                 
140 Norris (n 40) 154. 
141 For instance, between NGBs, sports coach UK, coaching organisations, coach educators and coaches.   
142 DoC in Sport Report (n 1) 16. 
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unpack distinctions between legal or moral duties of care, by perhaps emphasising and 
discussing the significance of coaches only assuming duties for which they are ordinarily 
competent for, appears compelling.  More fundamentally, an aim of such training should be 
to proactively ensure that all of the sport’s stakeholders are aware of the danger of 
conflating moral and legal duties of care. Appropriate strategies could then be adopted to 
prevent coaches from being compromised in this regard. 
 
Conclusion 
Critical analysis of a sports coach’s duty of care reveals a context where the law and 
morality are not necessarily inextricably interwoven.  Failure to appreciate this subtly, 
blurred by connotations that likely flow from the pseudo-legal gloss of duty of care 
terminology, may unwittingly expose (mainly volunteer) coaches to an unreasonable future 
risk of legal liability.  Whilst this submission is in no way intended to detract from the 
extremely worthwhile recommendations of the DoC in Sport Report, or a commitment to 
the highest standards in athlete safety and welfare, it is intended to make a valuable 
contribution to Baroness Tanni Grey-Thompson’s hope of stimulating further discussion on 
the application of duty of care principles in the specific context of sport. Moreover, the 
original insights revealed by scrutinising distinctions between legal and moral duties of care 
in a somewhat novel context is submitted to be of significance beyond the confines of sport.  
So whilst the concerns highlighted in this article may also be of immediate and direct 
relevance to the duties of care incumbent upon sports referees and officials, this also 
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representing an area with developing and recent case law in the UK,143 the important 
implications discussed are likely to be of more widespread relevance.  For instance, given 
the considerable reliance on volunteers in the EU – most notably in the sectors of sport;  
social, welfare and health activities; religious organisations; culture; recreation and leisure; 
and education, training and research144 --  in view of the likely relevance and application of 
the ‘neighbour principle’ in these contexts, explicitly distinguishing between legal and moral 
duties would appear both prudent and necessary.  More specifically, since the issue of 
breach of duty by coaches represents a distinctively nuanced issue of professional liability, 
this article’s uncovering of distinctions between legal and moral duties of care appears likely 
to be of relevance and merit in the area of professional negligence more generally.  This 
appears a particularly convincing submission since moral and ethical considerations may 
become indicative of the prevailing ‘social conditions and habits of life’ that impact upon 
standard of care enquires,145 and which regardless of associated advances in knowledge, 
may similarly heighten the standard of the reasonably competent practitioner.146  Further, 
given what appears to be the increasing propensity for the concept of the duty of care to be 
employed in order to create a gloss of pseudo-legal authority, ordinary reasonable persons, 
recognised bodies, and indeed government departments (i.e., DCMS), should be advised to 
be acutely aware of the potential implications should legal and moral duties of care become 
regarded as being one and the same.  Whilst concentrating on some of the unintended 
consequences of failing to appreciate the differences between legal and moral duties of 
                                                 
143 E.g., Bartlett v English Cricket Board Association of Cricket Officials (unreported), County Court 
(Birmingham), 27 August 2015; Allport v Wilbraham [2004] EWCA Civ 1668; Vowles v Evans [2003] EWCA Civ 
318; Smoldon v Whitworth [1997] PIQR P133 (CA); See further, Partington (n 38). 
144 Study on Volunteering in the European Union (n 131) 9.  See further, N Partington, ‘Volunteering and EU 
Sports Law and Policy’ in J Anderson, R Parrish and B Garcia (eds), Research Handbook on EU Sports Law and 
Policy (Edward Elgar, 2018)  98-119. 
145 Percy and Walton (n 49) [6-04]. 
146 See further, Powell and Stewart (n 95) [2-135].   
 33 
care in the specific context of sport, the insights revealed here appear likely to be of much 
more widespread contemporary significance and interest. 
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